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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit = Won
U. S. $1.00 = Wlon 400
Won 1,000 = U. S. $2.50
Won 1,000,000 = U. S. $2,500
INTERNATICNAL BANK FOR RECCNSTRUCTI0N AND DE7EFDPFEMT
REPORT AND RECOMMNDATION OF THE FRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS CN A FROPOSED LOAN TO
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FCR A FOURTH RAILROAD PROJECT
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a
proposed loan to the Republic of Korea for the equivalent of US$40
million to help finance a project for the Korean National Railroad
(KNR). The proceeds of the loan would be relent to the INR for 25
years, including 4 years of grace, with interest at 7_ percent per
annum.
PART I - THE ECONONY
2. Korea's commendable performance in economic development
during the 1960s was revi.ewed in the last economic report (EAP-25a
dated September 13, 1971). It noted that rapid industriaJlization and
a phenomenal growth of exports had been the main engines of growth in
Korea's economic development in the 196 0's, and made possible a real
GNP grawth rate of more than 11 percent a year. The report also pointed
out, however, that this rapid growth had been accompanied by ever-
increasing dependence on imports, widening balance of payments deficits
and large foreign capital inflows, as well as continuous inr Mtion.
Unrestrained continuation of the past pattern of growth would thus have
given rise to difficulties in the balance of payments and serious problems
in extexnal debt management.
3. The recent economic mission, whose report is being prepared
now, indicates that the government's efforts towards establishing a more
moderate and stable growth pattern and improving the external payments
position, as postulated in the government's Third Five-Year Economic
Development Plan (1972-76),have begun to take effect. The growth rates
of both output and investment have slowed down markedly since the middle
of 1971, partly as a result of the government's stabilization policy and
partly due to business uncertainty relating to intermational monetary
instability, the United Stated curb on textile imports from East Asian
countries, and an economic slowdown in Japan, Korea's second largest
trade partner. In the first seven months of 1972, exports expanded again
at an annual rate exceeding 40 percent, but there is as yet no correspond-
ing recovery in industrial production for the domestic market or in
industrial investment. As a result, GNP growth in 1972 may be 'Less than
8 percent.
4. The prospects for continued rapid expansion of industrial
exports and further import substitution now seem somewhat better than a
year ago. A surge in exports in the first half of thi$ year is an
indication of the improved international competitiveness of Korean
producers, partly as a result of the Won devaluation of more than 26
percent in the past 18 months and the revaluation of the Yen, but also
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because of the adaptability of Korean exporters to changing market
conditions. Import substitution seems likely to gain new momentum
in the coming few years in response to the government's incentive
policies and in part as a result of recent investments in the iron
and steel and petrochemical industries.
5. In recent months, the government made two important policy
decisions: one to deal more decisively with price inflation and the
widespread financial difficulties of industrial firms, and the other
to give greater emphasis to agricultural development, and consequently
to permit a more equitable distribution of development gains.
6. In August, the government announced a stabilization policy
package which included: an austere budget for 1973 and continued monetary
restraint in order to keep economic expansion at a moderate pace; and
firmer price controls, which together with a more stable exchange rate,
a "freeze" on public utility rates, and smaller increase in government
support prices of foodgrains are meant to eliminate cost-push factors.
To alleviate financial difficulties of industrial firms with predominant-
ly short-term, high cost domestic debts as well as large foreign debts,
the government took measures to consolidate domestic loans into longer-
term, low cost finance. It also established an Industrial Rationalization
Fund as a means whereby the government can assist particularly distressed
firms, on a selective basis, to reorganize, modernize, and improve their
capital structure. The policy package is a bold but well thought-out
attempt to break the inflation psychology that in recent years has been
part of the Korean economic scene, while preventing the financial
difficulties of firms from disrupting further industrial development.
7. On the agricultural side, the government decided to launch a
comprehensive rural development program, called the New Community Move-
ment. The Third Five-Year Plan already proposed increased investment in
agriculture beyond the levels of earlier plans; the new program as now
envisaged represents further expansion and acceleration of agricultural
investment programs for eight purposes: expansion of irrigation facilities;
comprehensive water-shed development; comprehensive slope-land development;
paddy rearrangement; farm modernization; marketing improvement and
expansion of processing facilities; rural electrification; and the estab-
lishment of rural sanitary and clinical facilities. To accomodate the
increase in agricultural investment and also to avoid conflicts between
the expanded investment program and the stabilization objective, some
scaling down of other parts of the Third Plan investment, and external
resources additional to those called for in the Plan, are likely to be
needed. The government is currently contemplating partial cuts in the
transportation sector. This and added stress in agricultural investment
is in line with the Third Plan strategy and with general policy recomend-
ations offered in recent Bank economic reports.
8. Taking the proposed revision of the Plan into account, the
external borrowing requirements can be expected to remain within manage-
able limits, although they will be particularly large in the next two
years, and are projected to amount to $900 million a year. The debt
service ratian now about 21 percent, should remain near that level and
then gradually decline after a few years, if the government keeps GNP
growth dowin to about 8.5 percent per annum. Korea has the capacity to
sustain further debt, if service is projected on a mixture of soft and
conventional terms. However, the current balance of payments situation
and Korea's still low per capita income (about US $276) make it appropri-
ate for some of the assistance it receives from the Bank Group to be on
IDA terms, and I expect to propose some IDA lending later this fiscal
year. Also, in spite of a commendable savings effort, there remains a
gap between savings and investment, w1hich cannot be entirely covered by
financing the foreign currency component of high priority projects. In
these circumstances some local expenditure financing is appropriate.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIGS IN KOREA
9. Korea has received seven Bank loans amounting to US $227.5
million and also seven IDA credits amounting to $87.0 million, taking
into account cancellations and the refinancing of one IDA credit in a
subsequent Bank loan. The proposed loan would bring total Bank Group
lending to Korea to $354.5 million,
10, Of the $314.5 million total Bank Group lending in the past,
$134.2 million has been for the transport sector - $79,7 million for
railways and $54.5 million for highways. The Norea Development Finance
Corporation has received $55 million in Bank loans for relending to
private indastry. $110.5 million has gone to agricultural projects and
the balance of $14.8 million to the education sector.
11. This would be the fourth Bank Group project with KMR. A
$14 million IDA credit was made in 1962 and another of $10.7 million in
1967. A joint loan and credit of $55 million total was extended in 1970.
The first two credits, which financed mainly rolling stock, have been
fully disbursed. The third project was to finance locomotives, rolling
stock and equipment needed for the 1967-71 development program of KNR.
On the whole, the execution of these projects has been satisfactory and
ENR has maintained a high level of operational efficiency.
12. Of total Bank Group lending, $187.8 million remained undisbursed
as of September 30, 1972. This large amount is mainly attributable to
the fact that withdrawals under several of the large loans made within
the past two years are starting only now. A mission is now in Korea to
appraise a second education project (up to $50 million). Other FY 1973
lending operations for ports ($40 million or more) and KDFC ($35 million)
are almost ready for appraisal. Cne other project may also be ready for
consideration in mid-1973: The Pohang Steel Mill Expansion, for which we
received in October a request for financing in association with other
lenders.
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13. IFC kes made four investments in Korea and its holdings
amount to US;$8.1 million in loans and shares. IFC made its first
equity invest,ment to DQFO, of $0.7 million or 14 percent of KDFC's
paid-in capital, at the time when the Bank made its first loan to KDFC.
The latest investment of IFC, in 1971, was a purchase of $0.6 million
of the shares of the Korean Investment and Finance Corporation - a new
institution whose function is to assist in the developmeznt of the capital
and money markets. Prospects for further IEC investments in Korea are
good. Annex I contains a summary statement of Bank loans, IDA credits
and IFO investments as of September 1972 and notes on the execution of
on-going projects.
PART III - TRAIZSMRT SECTOR
14. The Bank's knowledge of the Korean transport sector is good
with regard to the main characteristics of the sector, traffic develop-
ments during the past ten years, principal projects carried out and their
financing, and future investment plans and requirements. Historically,
the railways and, to a lesser extent, coastal shipping, have been the
two major modes of transportation irn Korea. The railways continue to
handle the bulk of freight traffic but there has also been a large
expansion in coastal traffic.
15. The preponderance of the railways in freight traffic and the
general economic role of the railwaysj are based in large part on location
patterns. Domestic natural resources, e.g., coal, iron ore and limestone,
are located in the north, northeast and center of the country and require
heavy bulk transport to the indLstrial areas, mainly located in and around
Seoul-Incheon and Pusan. Thus, about 85 percent of rail freight traffic
consists of bulk commodities, with an average length of haul of 240 kms.
This factor of location makes movement by rail the most economical means
of transportation for a large proportion of the total movement of commod-
ities.
16. In addition, during recent years the capacity of the railways
has been substantially expanded while improvements of the road network
have been relatively neglected, with the exception of limited access
expressways (see paragraph 17 below). Restrictions on importation of
vehicles severely limited the number of available trucks until 1967 when
domestic assembly was started, and kept down expansion of the road
vehicle fleet. Thus the railways have been in a better position than the
roads to handle the increased demand for freight transport.
17. Most roads are badly aligned, narrow, poorly drained and either
roughly surfaced with gravel or unsurfaced; only 10 percent of the total
network is paved. In line with the recommendations of the 1965 Bank-
financed Transport Survey and of Bank economic missions, the government
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has greatly increased the allocations for highway construction since
1968. However, a large part of these funds was allocated to the
construction of two toll expressways (Seoul-Pusan, 428 km,, and Seoul-.
Inchean, 29.5 lmn), of which the Secul-Pusan was economically premature
in many sections. This resulted in a shortage of funds for improvement
and maintenance of the existing roads and also diverted passenger
traffic from the railways on the Seoul-Pusan route. Road transport
also has captured the bulk of the increase in passenger traffic through-
out Korea.
18e The large expansion in coastal shipping and the major role
it has now assumed in total freight traffic (30 percent of the total in
1970) reflect in part factors of location, in part the construction of
port facilities for specific industrial complexes and in part the short-
age of rail and road capacity. The major commodities carried by coastal
shipping are oil, cement and coal.
19. There has been a large expansion in port capacity which,
however, is still insufficient, due to the rapid growth of port traffic,
wdth the result that bottleneclcs and congestion have been experienced
in the major ports. There has been a tendency to spread expenditures
among various ports, and this has no doubt reduced the effectiveness of
the investments made. Another development has been the construction of
specialized ports intended to serve a number of complexes, e.g., Pohang,
Ulsan and Masan.
20. As in other countries, one of the objectives of transport
policy has been the attainment of greater self-sufficiency in merchant
shipping. Although investments were made by the private tector, the bulk
of investments has been channelled through government financial institu-
tions at low interest rates. About 24 percent of total foreign trade
tonnage has been carried by Korean vessels during recent years.
21, Air transport remains comparatively unirportant. The privately-
owned Korean Air lines (KAL) provides domestic and some international
flights. Most traffic is handled at the Seoul-Kimpo International
Airport.
22. The Bank's lending program and strategy in the transport
sector concentrate on helping to overcome the shortcomings of the
transport system while also attacking certain problems in the sector.
A major sector-wide problem is the need for improvement in transport
planning and coordination. Substantive issues relating to investment
planning, and important policy measures, do not receive adequate attenw
tion. Part of the problem has been that transport coordination has not
received sufficiernt support from senior government officials. The Bank
has made a major effort over the past few years to convince the govern-
ment of the need for proper planning and coordination which might mean
some reorganization of the agencies which should be doing the overall
planning. In the meantime, areas which could be improved within the
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present framework are taken up under this project. The Loan Agreement
(Section 4,o6) provides for a review of the functions and work program
of the Transport Planning Office (TPO) in the I'nistry of Transportation,
including: the collection and preparation of data relating to costs and
operation of all modes of transport; action to ensure that all relevant
government agencies will furnish to TPO all major investment proposals;
and the strengthening of economic expertise in the TPO.
23. The Bank is active in helping the government attack the
problems of the road sysftm. The first highway project, which is being
executed satisfactorily, includes financing for feasibility and detailed
engineering studies for sections of national highways, and a study of
the organization of highway maintenance, a major problem. These studies
will be used as a basis for formulating future highway projects. Pre-
paration of the second highway project is well advanced and an appraisal
mission is scheduled for the first quarter of calendar 1973. The
allocation of investment priority among national highways and provincial
roads, and between major realignments of roads and the paving of already
existing alignments, is another serious problem. The government recog-
nizes the need to give more emphasis to the paving of existing alignments
as opposed to concentrating on major realignments; to this end, the
government is preparing a paving program for national highways, some of
which may be included in the proposed Second Highway Project, Government
also recognizes the need to improve some provincial roads and has indi-
cated that it intends to identify and prepare such work for consideration
by the Bank for financing under a future highway project.
24. The Bank has been executing agency for a UNDP port development
study which has identified a ports project which should be ready for
lending in FY 1973. The key issues in this sub-sector are the need for
a proper cost accounting system and higher port charges to ensure the
financial viability of ports, and the need for a new port organization
having responsibility for both planning and operation.
25. In the railroad sub-sector the major problem is the need to
improve the financial position of MNR. This problem, and details of
Bank Group involvemernt in the Korean railway system, are dealt with in
the paragraphs below.
PART IV - THE PROJECT
26. In October 1971, the government approached the Bank for
financial assistance for KNR. The Banlc identified this project, which
was appraised in December 1971. Negotiations for the proposed loan
were held in Washington between September 15 and September 29, 1972.
Tne government was represented by Messrs: Hbng, My=u Hoo - 'PlanninK O.:
o'rdinator (IQJB); lTei' ,1g S ohg - Cmef z'OIrstnIpan Division, E~conornic
'Jaannimig oard and Ahn,-Chang_Hwa -oChiDf; O'erl I Planning Office lKNR)a
27. MNR's investment plan for the 1972-76 period has been
thoroughly reviewed by and discussed with the Bank, and calls for
an outlay of about US$340 million equivalent with a foreign exchange
component of $181 million. The project is NR's 1972-74 investment
plan totalling $265 million with a foreign exchange component of about
$157 million, of ubich $40 rdillion would be covered by the proposed
loan. Another $15 million in foreign exchange will be disbursed in
this period from the Third Railway Project (loan/credit 669/t83 KO).
Of the remaining foreign exchange requirement, $49 million will be
provided by a consortium of European manufacturers, $35 milAion by a
Japanese yen credit, about $6 million from KI Germany, and the govern-
ment is expected to contribute about $12 million.
28. The proposed project includes: the completion of the already
started electrification of industrial lines; electrification of EKR
lines in the Seoul suburban areas as part of the rapid transit project
for the Seoul Metropolitan area; ccnstruction of a new link from the
second Incheon port to an exdisting railway line; installation of
centralized traffic control in the Seoul area; improvement of marshal.
ing yards and freight handling facilities; complete track and rail re-
newals; bridge strengthening; procurement of track maintenance and re-
newal equipment; purchase of passenger and freight cars; improvement
of facilities for repair of motive power and rolling stock; and instal.r-
bticn of some telecommunications facilities.
29. The project costs are based on latest prices and are reasonable.
Contingency provision has been made on the basis of price increases of
6 percent per annum for localcosts and 4 percent per annum for foreign
currency costs. Price cantingencies now represent about 7e5 percent
of total project costs.
30. All goods to be financed by the proposed loan would be pro-
cured through international competitive bidding. Local manufacturers
are expected to participate in the bidding for bridge girders, and
possibly for ordinary passenger cars. Local fiasis have capability and
experience in the fabrication of bridge girders, but there are no Korean
firms with previous experience in the manufacture of passenger cars.
KNR will select local firms to be: permitted to bid for passenger cars
after a proper prequalificatimn procedure established in consultation
with the Bank. If Korean firms are permitted to bid and are successful
in wirning these contracts, a total of up to $8 million to finance
local currency expenditures could be disbursed from the proceeds of the
proposed loan. For the purpose of bid evaluaticn, local bidders be
gg aprefsrenbn iargn of 15 percent or the level df customs duties,
Whici;er.M&iower.r The current customs duties-are 40 percent for
bride-'g'irderss and zero for passenger cars.
31. MZR was reorganized in 1963, in accordance with a law required
under the Credit Agreement for the Second Railroad Project, as a semi-
autonom,ous agency within the government with an independent manager and
its own btLdget and accaomting system. The goverrment exercises.control
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over KWR in staff, financial and budgetary matters.
32. The management of KKR is generally satisfactory and the
efficiency of operations is high. Maintenance of property and equip-
ment is satisfactory to date. EQR lacks senior qualified engineering,
economic and accounting staff in relation to the size and complexity
of the Korean railway system. Until this deficiency can be remedied,
KNR will have to rely on consultants fr.r certain activities; during
the execution of this project these will include consultants for the
electrification of KNR lines in the Seoul suburban area, provision of
telecommications facilities and accounting improvements.
33. Until recently, ANR kept two sets of accoants: commercial
accounts providing management information, and acceunts set up accord-
ing to the traditional system providing for expenditure control by the
government. As agreed under Credit 183-KO, the government authorised
KNR to abandon the government form of accounting from January 1971 and
to maintain its accoumts and financial statements solelyr in accordance
with commercial accounting practices. KNR's progress in implementing
the system is slow. KNR and the Bank discussed ways to further improve
the system during negotiations. It was agreed that KNR wrould employ
the accounting consultants mentioned in paragraph 32, and that a time-
phased program for implementing the system would be established. Train-
ing of selected ENR operational and engineering staff is currently
under way and is eatisfactory.
34. XNR's most serious problem since approval of the Third
Railroad project has been financial. KNR enjoyed significant increases
of net operating revenue during 1967-69, and at the time of appraisal
of the third project 3n 1969, the prospects for further improvement
appeared good; however, this proved to be too optimistic and the rate
of return declined so that there was a small operating deficit in 1971,
rather than the rate of return of 7 percent specified in Credit 183-KO.
The main causes were: (i) a decrease in passenger traffic during 1970
and 1971, largely because of the opening of the four-lane Seoul-Pasan
Expressway on which imported air-conditioned buses have been under
operation since 1970; (ii) a relatively slow growth of freight traffic
partly due to KNR's shortage of motive power and rolling stock; and '
(iii) general increases in prices and staff costs not compensated for
by freight tariff adjustments. To improve the situation, the government
authorized ENR to increase its freight tariffs by an average of 20 per-
cent from February 1972. This should help KNR to earn a small operating
surplus in 1972 but will not improve ENR's finances sufficiently.
35. The questions of appropriate financial targets for KNR and
tariff adjustments needed to improve its finances were discussed with
KNR and the government during negotiations. It was agreed that the
objective should be for KNR to generate funds adequate to cover fully
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its operating expenditure and debt service obligations and finance a
reasonable part of its investment needs including replacement. In
KNR's present situation regarding investment needs, debt position,
etc., as projected over the next few years, a rate of return of about
5 percent would be adequate to meet this objective; however, it
would not be realistic to expect to achieve this target immediately.
Consequently it was agreed (Section 4.07 of the Loan Agreement) that
XNR would progressively improve its position and achieve a rate of return
of at least 2 percent on its net fixed assets in use by 1975, 3 percent
by 1976 and 5 percent by 1978. A specific program of measures to be
taken after 1973 has been agreed, including passenger and freight
increases by specific dates in 1974., 1975 and 1976, and cost reduction
measures. In view of the stabilization program described in paragraph 6
above, especially the freeze on public utility rates, it was agreed that
rail tariff increases would not be implemented in 1973, but it also
was agreed that if there is any relaxation in these economic measures,
an increase in railway tariffs in 1973 will be given priority.
36. During this transitional period, KNR will need financial
assistance from the government in order to meet all of its obligations,
and the government has agreed to provide all necessary funds.
37. The Investment Plan and the proposed project have been found
to be technically and economically justified and an assessmeait of the
investment plan indicates an economic rate of return of about 20 percent.
PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMNTS AND AUTHORITY
38. The draft Loan Agreement between the Republic of Korea and
the Bank, the Report of the Committee provided for in Article III,
Section 4 (iii) of the Articles of Agreement and the text of a Resolution
approving the proposed Loan, are being distributed to the Executive
Directors separately. The Loan Agreement follows the pattern of Bank
agreements for loans of this kind.
39. I am satisfied that the proposed loan would comply with the
Articles of Agreemernt of the Bank.
PART VI - RECOMENDATICNI
40. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
loan.
Robert S. McNamara
Attachments
Novemaber a, 1972
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THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPEATICNS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IKOREA
A. STATEMEINT OF BANK LOANS AND IDA CREDITS
(as of September 30, 1972)
Loan or US $ m.11lion
Credit Amount(less cancellations)
Number Year Borrower Parpose Bank IDA Urdisbursed
25 1962 Republic of Korea Railway 14.0 -
110 1967 Republic of Korea Railway 10.7 -
529 1968 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 5.0 -
600 1969 ADO Irrigation 45.0 37.1
151 1969 Jlepublic-of.Korea Education 14.8 13.2
622 1969 EDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 200 4.1
669 1970 Republic of Korea Railway 40.0 6.7
183 1970 Republic of Korea Railway 15.0 0.1
234 1971 Republic of Korea Livestock 7.0 5.8
735 1971 KDFC Dev.Fin.Co. 30.0 1 9.1
769 1971 Republic of Korea Highway 54.5 43.3
283 1972 Republic of Korea Irrigation 15.0 15.0
795 1972 Republic of Korea Irrigation 33.0 32.9
335 1972 Republic of Korea Agricultural
Credit 10,5 10.5
Total 227.5 87.0 187.8
of which has been repaid 0.9 -
Total now outstanding 226.6 87.0
Amount sold 1.5 -
-To,t:now held .by.3ank .and IDA 225.1 87.0
Total undisbursed 143.2 44.6 187.8
B. STATENT OF IFC IlNVEST1IENTS
(as at September 30, 1972)
Amount in US$ nillion
Year Cbligor Type of Business Loan Equity Total
1968 KDFC Development
financing - 0.7 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Co. Textiles 1.4 0.3 1.7
1970 Atlas Paper Co. Pulp & paper 4.5 0.5 5.0
1971 Korea Investment Money & Capital
& Finance Corp. markets - 0.6 0.6
Total conrdtted 5.9 2.1 8.0
Uhdisbursed 5.1 1.2 6.3
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TRANS &ORTATION
Third Railroad Project (Loan/Credit 669/183, Signed in
lshy 1970). Disbursements are now proceeding satisfactorily. Other
developments relating to KKR are discussed in the body of this report.
First Highays Project (Loan 769, Signed in June 1971) This
project is progressing satisfactorily and is discussed in greater
detail in the body of this report. A3.1 construction contracts have
now been let and no significant delays are expected.
AGRICULTURE
Pyongtaek-Kumgan Irri ation Project (Loan 6 0Signed in
Nay 1969). The original borrower was dissolved shortly after the loan
was signed and replaced by the Agricultural Development Corporation0
It also took longer than expected to employ consultants. The project
fell about a year behind schedule, but is now well under way and may
be completed within the original timetable; however, this year, the
government has not provided adequate local finance and if this continues
in 1973 the project could be delayed again. The same situation applies
to the Yong San Gang project (see below). A supervision mission now in
the field is discussing the budgetary position of these two projects,
and ways to improve it, with the government.
Yong San Gang Irrigation IProject (Loan/Credit 795/283)
§igned in Febuaury 1972). This project is getting under way satis-
factorily although there may be a future problem if the government is
not able to solve the problem of providing adequate funds in the budget
(see Pyongtaek-Kumgang project, above).
Integrated D:ai Beef Develonment Project _Credit 234, Signed
in Februar 1971). Physically, this project is progressing well but the
beneficiaxy 1 a financial problem. Under the Second &ubsidiary Loan
Agreement between the govemnment, the Agriculture and Fishery Develop-
ment Corporation (AFDC) and the Korea Dairy Beef Comparny (IKDBC) required
in the Credit Agreement, the government's contribution to the project
should be on-lent to KDBC by AFDC. However, because of an argument
about interest rates KDBC has not yet been provided with the agreed funds
and this is hindering the efficiency of KDBC's operation. A fturther
complication is the fact the KDBC bears a foreign exchange risk and
the Won has been devalued about 30 percent since the appraisal in April
1970. On August 22, 1972, we reqcested that the government propose a
solution to tbis problem by the end of October and a supervision mission
visited Korea in September to discuss the problem, IDBC and the govern-
ment are now studying the situation and the government has said it will
meet the deadline for proposing a solution.
ANNEX I
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.Agriltural Credit Project (Credit 335, Signed in September
1972). The Executive Directors approved this project on May 16, 1972.
Approval was cmnditional, subject to the availability of IDA funds.
The Credit documents were signed on September 29, 1972.
EDUCATION
First Education Project (Credit 151, Signed in Jume 1969).
After initi-al delays in organizing the project implementation unit the
project is now progressing satisfactorily. Bids for all schools have
ben received and awards are being made.
IDUSTRY
Second and Third KDFC Projects (Loans 622 and 735, Signed in
June 1969 and Nay 1971). These loans are progressing satisfactoriJ.y.
The Secod project funds are fully committed. Commitments under the
Third loan have been slowed scmewhat by conditims described in the
Economic Section of this report, but under present trends, it is ex-
pected that KDFC will need additional commitment authority by August
of next year and thus a loan in FY 1973 is projectedl.
ANIIEX II
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COUNTRY DATA - KOREA
AREA: POPULATION: DENSITY: 2
98,477 km 31.85 million (1971) 309 per km (1971)
Rate of Growth: 1.6% (1971)
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: HEALTH: (1969)
Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000): 28.0 (1971) Population per physician: 1,236
Crude Death Rate (per 1,000): 8.0 Population per hospital bed: 1,914
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live births): .. at
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP:-
INCOME DISTRIBUTIOIN:-/ % owned by top 10% of owners: 24.3%
% of national income, lowest quintile: 8 % owned by smallest 10% of owners: 1.5%
highest quintile: 43
ACCESS TO PIPED WATER: ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY:
% of population - urban:
- rural: .
NUTRITION:
Calorie intake as % of requirements: EDUCATION:
Per capita protein intake: Adult literacy rate % (1970): 85%
Primary school enrollment % (1970): 96.9%
GNP PER CAPITA: 280 (US $. 1971) -/
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1971 ($1 : 351 Won) -/ ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (% constant prices) -
$ % . 1960-65 1965-70 1971
GNP at market prices 8792 100.0 5.8 11.3 9.8
Gross investment 2299 26.1 15.3 33.2 6.3
Gross National Savings 1291 14.7 151.5 46.1 8.9
Current Account Balance - 1011 -11.4 20.1 38.0 26.1
Exports of Goods, NFS 1464 16.7 24.0 37.6 10.1
Imports of Goods, NFS 2467 28.1 8.7 31.0 11.0
OUTPUT, LABOR FORCE AND
PRODUCTIVITY (1971):
Value Added Labor Force Value Added per Worker
(US$ million) 70 (million) % (US $) %
Agriculture 2558 29.1 4.71 48.5 543 60
Industry (Mining and
Manufacturing) 1954 22.2 1.38 14.2 1,416 156
Services & Other 4279 48.7 3.62 37.3 1.182 131
8792 100.0 9.71 100.0 905 100
PUBLIC FINANCES (W billion)
All Governments Central Government
% of GNP % of GNP
1971 1971 1971 1971
Current Receipts 606.0 19.5 522.7 16.8
Current Expenditures 387.4 12.4 25$.8 8.4
Capital Receipts 137.9 4.4 85.6 2.7
Capital Expenditures 272.6 8.7 141.6 4.7
External Assistance (net) 72.2 2.3 20.0 0.6
a/ Data based on acreage cultivated by farm households. Data on ownership are not available.
b/ Rough synthetic estimates based on urban and farm household surveys in 1970 and 1971.
c/ Based on the World Bank "Atlas" methodology. US $276 per capita on the basis of the current
exchange rate.
d_ Based on B.O.K.'s monthly average data for 1971.
e/ 1965 prices,
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COUNTRY DATA - KOREA
June June
MONEY, CREDIT and PRICES 1965 1969 1970 1971 1971 1972
'k(ITlion won outstanding end period)
Money and Quasi Money 97.1 670,7 890.8 1037.6 968.1 1181.0
Bank Credit to Public Sector 15.7 3.4 - 13.5 - 24.5 - 49.7 - 41.4
Bank Credit to Private Sector 78.6 640.6 861.1 1124.4 983.4 1272.5
(Percentages or Index Numbers)
Money and Quasi Money as % of CDP 12,2 33.2 35.2 34.5
General Price Index (1963=100)E/ 148.2 197.8 216.0 234.6 229.4 269.3
Annual Percentage Changes in:
General Price Index 10.0 6.8 9.1 8.6 6.4 17.4
Bank credit to Public Sector 110.0 -53.0 - 397.0 - 83.0 - 59.8 16.7
Bank credit to Private Sector 4.8 46.7 72.6 46.9 34.7 29.4
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (f.o.b.)
1969 1970 1971 (AVERAGE, 1969-71)
(Millions US $) (Millions US $) %
Exports of Goods, NFS 1112.8 1341.0 1587.2 Clothing 226 26.8
Imports of Goods, NFS 1902.6 2106.7 2514.7 Wood & Cork 101 12.0
Resource Gap (deficit = 1) - 789.8 - 765.7 - 927.5 Veneer Sheets &
Plywood 98 11.6
Interest Payments (net) 31.7 59.8 87.5 Textiles 96 11.4
Other Factor Payments (net) - 27.1 - 22.8 3.1 Wigs, etc. 77 9.1
Net Transfer Receipts h/ 139.5 93.6 105.6 Electric Machines
Balance on Current Account- - 654.9 - 709.1 -912.5 & Equipment 49.7 5.8
Others 194.0 23.3
Direct Foreign Investment 15.9 38.0 55.8 841.7 100.0
Net MLT Borrowing 556.4 214.0 327.2
Disbursements (665.0) (417.0) (553.0)
Amortization (108.6) (203.0) (225.8) EXTERNAL DEBT, DECEMBER 31. 1971:
Official Grants 106.3 86.6 65.0 (Million US $)
Other Capital (net) 102.0 447.5 382.9
Increase in Reserves - 121.6 - 60.8 68.5 Public Debt (including
undisbursed) 3021.8
All other items - 4.1 - 16.2 13.1 Total Outstanding
Gross Reserves 553 610 568 & Disbursed 2061.9
DEBT SERVICE RATIO (1971):
RATE OF EXCHANGE: In % of Exports of Goods/Services 19.4
December 31, 1971 June 1972 IBRD/IDA LENDING, APRIL 30, 1972:
US $1.00 = 370 Won US $ 1.00 = 400 Won (Million US $)
w 1.00 = $.0027 W 1.00 = $.0025
IBRD IDA
Outstanding & Disbursed 41 40
Undisbursed 154 21
Outstanding including
Undisbursed 195 61
g/ Wholesale Price Index.
F/ Excludes official grants.
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KCREA - THE FOURTH RAILRQAD PROJECT
LOAM AND PROJECT SUMMARY
Borrower: The Republic of Korea
Beneficiary: The Korean National Railroad (KNR)
Amount: US$40 million equivalent
Terms: Payable in 25 years with 4 years grace at 7-1/4 percent
interest per annum, through semi-annual installments
beginning April 1, 1977 and &nmding October 1, 1997.
Relending Terms: The loan will be passed on to ENR on identical terms.
Project
Description: KCREAN RAILWAY PROJECT
The project forms part of the KNR Investment Plan
(1972-76). The proposed project includes: the
completion of the already started electrification
of industrial lines; electrification of KNR lines
in the Seoul suburban areas as part of the rapid
transit project for the Seoul Metropolitan area;
construction of a new link from the second Incheon
port to an existing railway line; installation of
centralized traffic control in the Seoul area; im-
provement of marshalling yards and freight handling
facilities; complete track and rail renewals; bridge
strengthening; procurement of track maintenance and
renewal equipment; purchase of passenger and freight
cars; improvement of facilities for repair of motive
power and rolling stock; and installation of some
telecommunications facilities.
Estimated Cost: Component (US$ million)
Local Foreign Total
1. New line construction 2.94 0.71 3.65
2. Electrification
(a) Industrial lines
electrification 9.93 13.82 23.75
(b) Seoul suburban
electrification 23.62 16.66 40.28
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gomponjent Local Foreili Total
3. Increase in station and
line capacity
(a) Signalling 9.83 6.35 16.18
(b) Double tracking of
Ho Nam Line (25 1m) 2.85 0.45 3.30
(c) Other works 13.77 1.65 15.42
4. Way and structure renewals
and improvements 12.30 14.76 27.06
5. mbtive power and
rolling stock
(a) Electric
locomotives (66) - 34.60 34.6o
(b) Electric
railcars (126) - 18.41 18.41
(c) Freight cars (2,449) 10.74 13.35 24.09
(d) Passenger cars (271) - 18.12 18.12
(e) Breakdown cranes - 1.37 1.37
(f) Other 1.14 0.88 2.02
6. b tive power and rolling
stock repair facilities 4.39 4.18 8.57
7* Mli.cellaneous 7.37 2.85 10.22
8. Total 1 to 7 98.88 148.16 247.04
9. Price contingencies 9.35 8.37 17.72
10. GRAND TOTAL 108.23 156.53 264.76
Financing Plan: US $ million
Proposed Bank loan 40.0
Bank/IDA loan/credit (669/183-KO) 24.1
Consortium of European manufacturers
(Belgium, France, Germary and Stzerland) 48.4
Japanese Yen credit 50.1
Kfw (German) 5.4
INR 14.9
Government 81.9
TOTAL 264.8
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Estimated
Disbursements: US$ million
1973 1974 1975 1976
18.7 17.3 3.9 0,1
Procurement
Arrangemants: AlU items to be financed by the proposed loan would be
acquired through international competitive bidding.
Localfirmis would be in a position to bid for bridge
girders (estimated at about US$1.2 million) and possibly
209 ordinary passenger cars (estimated about US$117
million)0
Consultants: (i) Electrifitation of KNR lines in Seoul suburban
areas.
(ii) Improvement to telecommunications.
(iii) Modexnization of accounting system.
Rate of Return: Economic rate of return is estimated at about 20 percent.
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